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Abstract 
Current approaches to risk management stress the need for dynamic (i.e. continuous, 
ongoing) approaches to risk identification as part of a planned resource application 
aimed at reducing the expected consequences of undesired outcomes for the object of 
the assessment.  We contend that these approaches place insufficient emphasis on the 
system knowledge available to the assessor, particularly in respect of three related 
factors, namely the dynamic behaviour of the system under threat, the role of human 
agents and the knowledge availability to those agents. 
In this paper, we address the rôle of knowledge use and availability in critical human 
activity systems (CHASs). We emphasize the distinction between information used 
within these systems as distinct from the knowledge deployed by their human 
inhabitants. 
The aim of the paper is to offer a procedure for the mobilization of knowledge assets 
in the identification and management of risk within the system, building upon 
previous work which focused on the mobilization of knowledge about the system. We 
see knowledge as being a system asset, both deployed within and originating from 
system behaviour. 
Using the ongoing 2014-2015 West African Ebola outbreak as an example, we offer a 
practical procedure using the well-known systems dynamics technique in its 
qualitative form (QSD) for the identification of risks and appropriate policies for 
managing those risks.  
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The rôle of knowledge in system risk identification and 
assessment: the 2014 Ebola outbreak 
Introduction 
This is one of a short series of papers (Powell et al, 2016; 2017) concerned with the 
identification and assessment of system risk as part of overall risk management, the 
process of identifying appropriate policies for the control and mitigation of risks 
under inevitably limited resource availability. Our focus is on safety and mission 
critical systems, particularly those which contain human agents whose decisions and 
actions form an inextricable part of the system assets. 
Checkland refers to these latter as human activity systems or HASs (Checkland and 
Scholes, 1990) and by extension we refer to the safety and critical subset of these as 
critical human activity systems, henceforth CHASs. We adopt a systemic approach in 
continuation of the line of system-focused OR work advocated by Ackermann and 
others over some years (Ackermann et al, 2007, 2014). 
An earlier paper (Powell et al, 2016) concentrated on system-based approaches to risk 
management. Such approaches can be seen through a knowledge lens in the sense that 
knowledge of the dynamics of a system is relevant in in understanding the origins of 
its risks. However, such knowledge is about the system, rather than being part of and 
therefore within the system. We distinguish therefore between ‘etic’ knowledge (i.e. 
knowledge about the system) and ‘emic knowledge’, being knowledge which forms 
part of the system itself. 
We also recognise the distinction between information and knowledge used within the 
system, whether by human agents or by automatic procedure.  
Our perspective on the roles of the human agents, the knowledge which they use and 
the physical system which both inhabit (known as the infrasystem for convenience) is 
that these are inextricably connected - neither has a system existence separate from 
the other. While it may from time to time be useful to focus upon the knowledge, the 
human agents or the infra-system, in fact they are projections of a single system 
definition, which is that of an infrasystem inhabited by human agents who utilize, 
process and indeed co-produce knowledge as part of that system’s operation. 
The human agent, in interacting with the system of which he or she is a part, utilizes 
many resources, depending on the task and role, but, in one form or another, 
knowledge is always part of that applied resource set, even if it is only knowledge of 
the individual’s role in the system. On a philosophical basis one could attempt to 
construct an artificial circumstance in which a human agent is an unknowing part of 
the system, say as a collateral victim of a disaster but in that extreme case we argue 
that the human agent then falls outwith the system boundary. 
 
The context of risk identification and assessment  
Risk management 
Risk identification, a precursor to the assessment of risk, is a subset of risk 
management, which, in general usage  (AIRMIC/ALARM, 2010; Crockford, 1986; 
Hopkin, 2012; USEPA, 2004) refers to a process of identification and assessment of 
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the likelihood of occurrence and impact of deleterious outcomes of an object in focus 
resulting from (potential) risk events which may or may not be reified in a particular 
circumstance (ISO/IEC, 2009; Stoneburner, Goguen and Feringa, 2002). We shall 
refer to the object of this analysis as a system (NIOSH, 1998), since, for it to be 
worthy of consideration, it will be of a complexity and span of impact greater than a 
single, undifferentiated event. In the case of an outbreak of an infectious disease, for 
example, the system is the logistic, clinical, social, economic, and political context in 
which an ‘infective event’ takes place. 
Risk management as a process, then, moves from identification and assessment to 
control, mitigation and consequence management (Moteff, 2005), seeking to 
accommodate inevitable resource limitations within an action plan (ISO/DIS 31000, 
2009) aimed at satisfying a set of outputs or consequences of the causative risk event 
(Stoneburner, Goguen and Feringa, 2002). It is the identification phase with which we 
are concerned here. 
Overall process of risk identification 
We note several general shortcomings in the accepted general practice of risk 
identification and its relations to system knowledge. 
The increasingly popular taxonomic and objective-based risk assessment (Trickey, 
2011; Airmic / Alarm / IRM, 2010; Borodzicz, 2005; Dorfman, 2007) are relevant, 
but while such approaches implicate the internal behavioural characteristics of the 
object under assessment (what we will refer to as the system behaviour), there is 
limited evidence of this important source of system risk knowledge being mobilized 
in an explicit way. Where there is evidence of knowledge being deployed it appears to 
be seen exclusively as an ‘emic’ property (de Zoysa, 2003; Ruzic-Dimitrijevic, 2014). 
There is thus a tendency both in academic literature and in practice to interpret the 
term ‘dynamic’ [as in ‘dynamic risk assessment”] as being to do with the extent to 
which the risk assessment is performed on a continuing basis, as opposed to a once-
for-all snapshot (Adams, 1995; Nederpelt, 2012).  
Second, although in a significant class of systems (safety or mission critical systems) 
the rôle of humans is frequently critical, we observe little in the way of structured 
analysis of the rôle of human agents in the operation of the assessed system (Hopkin, 
2012). We refer to these, pace Checkland (Checkland and Scholes, 1990) as critical 
human activity systems or CHASs.  
Third, particularly in the case of CHASs, there is little analysis of the rôle of 
knowledge in the interaction of the human agents with the system under assessment 
(Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). It is clear that, in a substantial sub-class of 
CHASs, the use of knowledge (as distinct from, but supported by information and its 
processing) is of critical importance in achieving the desired system behaviours. 
Mutatis mutandis, failure to provide relevant knowledge at the point and time of need 
can, in itself, provoke or even constitute system failure (Hubbard, 2009). The 
knowledge in a system is as much a part of that system as the system itself and its 
users carry, derive, import, disseminate and use that knowledge as part of that system. 
Thus, the rôle of knowledge not only influences the system behaviour and hence its 
outputs at a particular time, but, through the co-production, importation and 
publishing processes, determines not only the behaviour of a system at a future time, 
but even the definition of the system itself, on the argument that the knowledge within 
the system forms part of the system itself.  
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Fourth, it is not clear from the existing literature whether sufficient emphasis is given 
in risk identification and assessment to the plural nature of the valuation of risk 
outcomes, by which we mean the different valuations placed by different stakeholders 
on system outcomes (Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Clarke, 2001). This also forms 
the subject of future work. 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a workable practical procedure for the 
inclusion of knowledge considerations in the risk identification process (critique 3 
above). We build on the knowledge management literature where system modelling 
methods have been used to map knowledge deployed in an organisation in order to 
manage that knowledge better. Here, however our managerial intent is different, 
namely to identify the rôle of knowledge in the system processes in order to 
determine where risks may emerge, primarily from the absence of knowledge (both 
tacit and explicit) at the time and place of need in the decision processes constitutive 
of the CHAS. 
 
Knowledge and Risk Analysis 
Existing approaches 
At first glance interest in the knowledge dimension of risk in systems appears 
extensive; a simple search on Scopus of key terms “Risk analysis AND knowledge” 
results in some 46,800 results. Analysis of the scope and assumptions of these papers 
shows patterns, however, which indicate some gaps in the treatment of knowledge as 
a system component in and of itself. 
Knowledge risk (Ishikawa and Naka, 2003; Massingham, 2010) is an analytical 
objective in many application domains such as  IT (Varajao, et al, 2017), disaster risk 
management (UNISDR, 2014, 2105a,b; Spiekermann et al, 2015), fisheries 
(McDonald et al, 2017), supply chains (Raut et al, 2017), social risk, ecological 
(Asfaq, 2017; Lou et al, 2017), safety at sea (Goerlandt et al, 2017), safety critical 
systems (Scott-Parker and Oviedo-Trespalacios, 2017; Bachani et al, 2017) and 
indeed in the effectiveness assessment of Knowledge Management itself (Boy and 
Barna, 2005; Benoit, 2011; Ruzic-Dimitrijevic, 2014). 
We observe in this extensive literature a clear tendency to treat knowledge as an 
aggregated, property of the system-in-focus (etic knowledge). No publications treat 
the knowledge within the system (emic knowledge) and, particularly the intimate 
connection between this within-system knowledge, the human agents and the 
underlying infrasystem, although there is some evidence of awareness of the need for 
this specificity in medical and social risk studies (Ashfaq et al 2017; Lou et al, 2017, 
Busby et al, 2017).  
In many cases, what is considered as specific knowledge in a system (such as the 
awareness of speed limits in road safety (Bachani et al, 2013) or the correct weighting 
of personal risks in a nuclear accident (Busby et al, 2017)) would be characterised as 
information, often critically important in its effect, but failing to satisfy ubiquitous 
criteria such as justified true belief, or more sophisticated understandings of 
knowledge. This latter view of knowledge can be seen essentially as a superior, 
contextualised or aggregated property of information (Davenport and Prusak, 1998) 
and/or as a social property deriving from the interaction/connectedness between 
persons (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Polanyi, 1966; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 
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2001). Critically, knowledge is seen as a distributed property of an organisational 
system (Tsoukas, 1996; Scarbrough et al., 1999; Powell and Swart, 2010) and, 
moreover, one which possess the capacity for action by an agent, an idea encapsulated 
in the acronym KHIA, or knowhow in action (Swart, 2011). There is, additionally, 
little evidence in these risk assessment approaches of the important distinction 
between explicit and tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966; Davenport and Prusak,1998; 
Baumard, 1999; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001). 
 
emic and etic knowledge 
This apparent neglect of the importance of knowledge (as distinct from information) 
in these systems is exacerbated by the failure to distinguish between knowledge about 
the system (etic knowledge) and that which forms part of the system itself (emic 
knowledge). There is some literature which discusses etic knowledge. Benoit, (2011), 
for example, discusses the most common failures of Knowledge Management 
systems; Apgar (2006) sees risk as ‘a learnable event’; Verhagen (2005) discusses 
how ‘knowledge informs decision makers’. Each of these authorities (which are 
together representative of the entirety of the literature) are concerned with knowledge 
of the system (etic) as opposed to that which is used as part of the system in 
operation. To decode: the reader may have knowledge about neurosurgery; the 
surgeon has knowledge of it, which he uses in carrying out the procedures in the 
operating theatre. It makes little sense to see as separate the surgeon and what he 
knows in effecting system output. 
 
KM approach 
There is evidence in the literature of the application of Knowledge Management 
(KM) approaches to the analysis of risk (Massingham, 2010; Boy et al, 2005, for 
example). Again, these approaches concentrate on the etic form of knowledge, 
producing managerial advice on knowledge risk reduction emerging from KM such 
as: establishing a learning climate; mitigating knowledge loss; creating channels for 
knowledge flow; developing a team shared memory and using the risk register to 
monitor knowledge risks. While these are clearly beneficial, they retain the 
disadvantage that they are dealing with knowledge in the system-in-focus as if it were 
separated from it rather as an emic component of the system, associated with but 
different from, say, the human agents who form part of the system. 
 
Types of risk 
Existing literature does provide a useful taxonomy of knowledge risk. 
 Absence 
 Incorrect knowledge (often called negative knowledge) 
 Insufficient  
 Selection risk (identifying the wrong knowledge to an application) (Ishikawa 
and Naka, 2003) 
 evaporation risk (knowledge becoming irrelevant over time) 
 Improper use 
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 Problems of knowledge sharing  
(Riege, 2005) 
 Causal and resultant risk in KM 
(Frost 2014) 
But again, examination of these categories indicates an acceptance of the rôle of 
knowledge as an etic property rather than as an inherent, emic, system property and 
component. 
It is this latter stance which we adopt in this paper. 
 
Utility 
In addition to the general benefits accruing from a system-informed risk assessment 
process (Ackermann, 2007, 2014; Powell et al, 2016) we note the observations of 
Aven (2013, 2016) on the need for integrative approaches and ’broader perspectives 
on the conceptualisation, assessment and management of risk”, with particular 
emphasis on “knowledge and lack of knowledge descriptions and characterisations in 
risk assessments”. Our intention in this appear is to move towards the fulfilment of 
that need for the specific inclusion of emic system knowledge in risk identification, as 
a part of the risk assessment process. 
Risk identification process advocated 
The risk identification process described in this paper entails a dynamic analysis of a 
qualitative system dynamics model (Coyle, 1996; Eden, 1989) having the general 
architecture of Figure 3. It builds on the basic process described in a previous paper 
(Powell et al, 2016), adding additional steps aimed at identifying the knowledge 
deployed by human agents (individually or in groups) in enacting the dynamic 
processes (Powell and Swart, 2005). In summary, the procedure is as follows: 
a. Construction of a System Dynamics Influence Diagram (ID) covering the 
required span of managerial interest. 
b. Examination of the key dynamic processes in the ID, represented by the 
loops. 
c. Identification of the human agents enabling those processes. 
d. Identification of the knowledge deployed in those processes by the human 
agents 
e. Identification of those knowledge components which have the capacity, if 
absent at place and time of need, to act as disruptors of the system 
performance. 
f. Identification of the effects of such disruptions. 
g. Expression of the risks identified thereby. 
Clearly subsequent risk analysis can identify mitigation, effects analysis and residual 
risk appraisal in the manner of existing practice. 
 
Ebola outbreaks 
Ebola, or more correctly, Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), is a highly infectious disease 
with a history of explosive occurrence in sub-Saharan Africa. There have been 
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outbreaks since its discovery in 1976 in The Democratic Republic of Congo (Anon, 
2003; Chowell et al, 2004; Dowell et al, 1999; Kerstiens and Matthys, 1999; Khan et 
al, 1999; Muyembe-Tamfumm et al, 1999),  Zaire (Anon, 1978b; Breman et al, 1978; 
Team RoaWIS, 1978; Walsh, 2005), Northern Uganda (Anon, 2001; Borchert et al, 
2011; CDC, 2001; Francesconi et al, 2003; Hewlett and Amola, 2003; Raabe et al, 
2010), Gabon (Georges et al, 1999), Sudan (Anon  1978a; Baron et al, 1983)), and, 
recently in a group of countries in West Africa, this latest outbreak being the largest 
in recorded history by some significant margin (See Figure 1) (Dixon and Schafer, 
2014; Merler et al, 2015; Nishiura and Chowell, 2014; WHO Ebola Response Team, 
2014; Yamin et al, 2015). The first case occurred in Guinea in December 2013, and 
the outbreak was recognized in March 2014 whereafter it quickly spread to Liberia 
(New York Times, 2014), Sierra Leone by May and reached Nigeria in July 2014 and 
Mali in October 2014. By August 2014, the World Health Organization had declared 
the outbreak a Public Health emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), and by 
September 2014 several cases had been reported outside Africa deriving both from 
infected health workers and from returning ex-patriate citizens, including the United 
Kingdom (UK). There was limited spread of the disease to carers in both the United 
States and Spain, curtailed by in situ procedures and processes in these more 
developed countries (WHO, 2016).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Explosive growth of EHF in West Africa 2014 (from E Check Hayden, 
2014) 
.  
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Figure 2: Weekly reported cases in three countries 2014 to 2016 (CDC, 2014)  
 
At the close of the outbreak, with the PHEIC declared over on 29th March 2016 and 
Liberia declared Ebola free on 9th June 2016, there had been 28,616 reported cases 
with 11,310 deaths, over ten times more cases than the sum total of all previous 
outbreaks (WHO, 2016b; CDC, 2017). 27 patients were manged in Western countries, 
with a grossly different case fatality rate than those seen in West Africa, of 18.5%, 
likely reflecting the vastly different resources in caring for these patients in more 
resource rich settings Uyeki et al, 2016). 
Though many novel therapeutic interventional agents were trialled, none showed any 
conclusive survival benefit. The one success of the response was the rapid 
deployment of a vaccine trial, which even though it was present at the end of the 
epidemic through an adaptive design demonstrated that ‘ring-fence’ vaccination of 
household contacts of a newly diagnosed case afforded considerable protection 
directly to the individuals and the wider community (Brown et al, 2017). This will be 
of considerable importance in future risk assessment.    
Novel surveillance activities in Sierra Leone included ‘lockdown’ activities with a 
door-to-door initiative searching for Ebola cases, centralised command and control 
structures, and community event based surveillance through training community 
members in rapid case detection and reporting (Houlihan et al, 2017). 
Considerable import has been placed on learning lessons from such as unprecedented 
outbreak, including the need for harmonised donor approaches to funding and support 
(STC, 2016) appropriate in situ plans for the delivery of a combined scientific and 
public health response such as the development of the UK Rapid Support Team 
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(Reece et al, 2017), and a more inclusive early approach to community engagement as 
a ‘critical operational tool’ (Gillespie et al, 2016).    
Previous EVD outbreaks have mostly occurred in rural villages with limited 
infrastructure, resulting in outbreaks with high case fatality rates (because of limited 
diagnostics and treatment measures and lack of expertise in managing viral 
haemorrhagic fevers) but limited transmission (because of the communicative 
isolation).  With the spread of infection to cities in all three main countries affected in 
the 2014-2016 outbreak, however, a wider set of factors came into play (Check 
Hayden, 2014). Not only was there increased travel from isolated areas to the 
infection centres, but industrialization and commerce in the urban infected areas 
provided mechanisms for contact between infectious individuals and those as yet 
unaffected. Counter-intuitively, there is also some evidence that access to the very 
health facilities aimed at suppressing the outbreak, in fact provide infection contexts, 
particularly early in the outbreak if adequate infection control measures are not 
adhered to. There was also early mistrust of the practices of care inside Ebola 
Treatment Centres, carried out away from public scrutiny inside isolated facilities by 
masked healthcare providers. This was later changed to allow communities more 
direct access to care, such as through removal of high perimeter fences (MSF, 2015)  
Cultural practices contributed to the extent of the outbreak, since there is a high risk 
for infection through contact with infectious body fluids, particularly during 
traditional burial practices (Folashade et al, 2015).  There were reports of beliefs early 
in the outbreak that EVD was an attempt by authorities to suppress local populations 
and that the health facilities themselves were the source of infection. This can result in 
cases being hidden from regional authorities, again prominent early in the disease 
transmission (Cafod, 2015).  
The effects of Ebola are not limited to health issues, however.  “The consequences of 
Ebola are vast,” said Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, the Director of UNDP’s Regional Bureau 
for Africa. “Stigma, risk aversion and shutting down of borders have caused 
considerable amounts of damage, affecting economies and communities in a large 
number of countries across the sub-region” (UNDP, 2015). International trade issues 
are also relevant, with inevitable, though somewhat overblown concerns in developed 
countries over the dangers of infection through international travel (Gomes et al, 
2014). It is estimated (CDC, 2016) that the West African Outbreak resulted in a $2.2 
billion loss in gross domestic product for Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia.  
We thus see that EVD possesses a number of characteristics which make it suitable as 
a study for the rôle of knowledge in critical human activity systems. 
 It is a significant human problem for a number of interested parties or 
stakeholders, which include patients, health workers, citizens of West African 
and other countries, travellers, governments, police authorities and aid 
agencies. 
 It is sufficiently complex, both in the sense that it is not well understood and 
because it is multifaceted, having, even at the highest level, aetiological, 
economic and political components. It is also likely to include non-linearities 
both in its component linkages and in its inputs over time (for example the 
arrival of RFA Argus, bearing 700 UK health workers, to Freetown in October 
2014). 
 Knowledge, both tacit and explicit, bears strongly on the performance of at 
least one component of the problem, namely the treatment of infected persons. 
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 The rôle of risk identification is clearly important in the future management of 
similar epidemic crises in order to limit direct and indirect effects and in the 
optimization of resource provision both in quantity and time. 
Knowledge considerations of Ebola 
The extent of the Ebola ’system’, by which we mean the set of interconnections which 
together create the outputs valued by and affecting stakeholders, is rather wide. It has 
immediate and local effect in the societies directly affected by the outbreak, effects 
which can be directly observed, measured and explained in a scientific manner, 
relying on empirical, testable data (the physical sub-model).  It also has effects 
deriving from socially-constructed phenomena, such as confidence in the economy, 
fear in the population, and distrust in control measures (the social context sub-model). 
Lastly, it has a political component, in the strict sense of considerations of policy, 
primarily resource allocation decisions reacting to observed system effects, the results 
of which affect not only the region but also the wider world (political and policy sub-
model). These are interconnected. See Figure 3 (Powell et al. 2016). 
 
Figure 3: Interconnection of sub-models (from Powell, et al, 2016) 
The next section will discuss the content of the model which we use later to 
investigate the risks present in the EVD outbreak, taking a knowledge perspective 
which is an extension of the general system dynamic treatment described elsewhere 
(Powell and Coyle, 2005; Powell and Swart, 2010; Powell et al , 2016). For the 
moment, we restrict ourselves to a brief listing of the main knowledge issues 
emergent ex ante from the extensive literature on EVD outbreaks. These can be 
divided into obvious groupings consonant with the architecture of Fig 3. 
Physical context 
 Knowledge and skills of health workers, their despatchers and resource 
analysts are clearly a significant component of the disaster control processes. 
Recognition of the need for future resourcing in particular is of specific 
concern in an accelerating outbreak, alongside appropriate actions at each 
stage of disease progression including recognition of bottlenecks in diagnosis, 
isolation, identification of patients, their subsequent treatment, and safe burials 
where necessary.  
 
 
 
social context 
political and policy 
physical model 
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 Knowledge of the aetiology of the virus, and consequent epidemic dynamics, 
as well as specifics of local high-transmission risk activities.  
 Equally, knowledge of the occurrence and distribution of infection in the 
populace, including air travellers (Bogoch et al, 2105), allows prompt 
identification and hospitalization of patients (Borchert et al, 2011; Farrar and 
Piot, 2014) an important factor in preventing the spread in urban areas, in 
particular (Kerstiens and Matthy, 1999; Ndambi et al, 1999). 
 Knowledge of infection mechanisms on the part of the population at risk 
informed by socially constructed beliefs (see below) conditions behaviour in 
the vicinity of potentially affected persons (Rowe et al, 1999). As an example, 
“After a villager there tested positive for Ebola, police put two houses under 
quarantine — and six people fled. Barrie, along with community leaders and 
public-health workers, then visited the remaining 30 residents to explain the 
reason for the quarantine and to answer questions. One man said that he 
needed someone to go and buy cigarettes, and another needed palm wine; 
health officials tasked a worker with making these daily deliveries. (Check 
Hayden, 2014). 
Social context 
 Assumptions and beliefs about the nature and origin of Ebola: its attribution to 
natural causes vis-à-vis ‘political intervention’, the benefits of community 
interventions such as quarantine and restrictions on physical movement, and 
the likelihood that presenting for care would affect outcomes (Check Hayden, 
2014). 
 Enculturated knowledge/belief about appropriate burial and associated 
practices (Raabe et al, 2010); Dowell et al, 1999). 
 Understanding the role of ethnic, cultural and national identities in an affected 
region involving communities that span shared borders. 
 Extent of understanding in the developed world about the need for 
intervention, particularly with regards to scale and rapidity of action. 
 Perceptions in the developed world about the risks associated with air travel 
from the region. 
Political and policy context 
 Acceptance and commitment of regional and developed-world authorities 
to intervention leading to direct and indirect foreign aid. 
 Perception of political threat to developed world and regional polities. 
 
There exists a clear difference in the outbreak curves seen in Figure 2 in the most 
affected countries, which has implications for the past and future control efforts. 
Those seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone both represent standard outbreak curves i.e. 
there is an incremental start, an exponential increase in cases as the infection spreads 
rapidly through a susceptible population, followed by a tail that represents the effects 
of either outbreak control measures (as in this case) or diminishing numbers of 
susceptible individuals, the rest having either survived with immunity or died. The 
curve for Guinea is different, and at first glance may suggest that there have been 
better control efforts there than the other countries.  However, the propagated nature 
suggests ongoing exposure, and indeed much later in the epidemic, at the tail of the 
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other countries, there remained a higher and static number of new infections. In 
addition, in Sierra Leone and Liberia most new cases arose from known contacts in 
quarantine, whereas in Guinea many cases could not identify an obvious contact. The 
implications of this include the possibility that there is circulating and potentially 
unreported cases in the community, with ongoing transmission outside of known 
networks. This small but steady number of new cases is therefore of significant 
concern. 
 
We now proceed to describe the extensive model on which the risk identification 
process is carried out. 
 
General modeling and analysis procedure 
We now summarise the recommended modeling and analysis procedure, 
concentrating on the risk identification section of the ISO 31000 recommendations 
(IOS, 2009 a,b). 
1. Modelling 
Using the architecture of Figure 3 as a guideline, establish an influence diagram 
detailing the physical realities of the system-in-focus together with the associated 
social and political contexts. We favour the Vensim© software (Ventana Systems, 
2017) for this purpose, although there are other graphic interfaces available. 
Here we have used existing published papers (See Table 1 - 3rd column) with a 
simple textual analysis to adumbrate appropriate system variables. In general, the 
extensive extant literature available for EVD will not be present and focus groups, 
commonly used in the building of such IDs, are an appropriate replacement. The 
production of these diagrams is therefore, inevitably a negotiation among 
members of the focus group. This has both advantages and disadvantages in that, 
on the one hand, the process of surfacing different perceptions of the system 
structure leads to an improves collective understanding of that system (Coyle, 
1996). On the other hand, there will be alternative interpretations of the system 
details, particularly from the point of view of subsequent observers who were not 
party to the originating discussions.   
The ID, then, should be viewed more as a visual transcript of a set of converging 
views, rather than as a (positivist) image of an undebatable reality. This 
indeterminacy is a consequence of the plural nature of two of the subsystems 
(social context and political policy of Figure 3). 
2.  Key dynamic processes 
Using the well-documented methods of QSD (Powell and Coyle, 2005; Howard et 
al, 2007) extract those closed cycles of causality (dominant loops) which are 
significant in the operation of the system-in-focus. This is best done by a 
combination of automatic and inspection methods. These loops can conveniently 
be categorized by their speed of operation and strength of influence on the overall 
system outputs as judged by the stakeholders. 
 
3. Human agency 
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For key (dominant) loops identify the human agents who have control over the 
behaviour of that loop.   
 
4. Knowledge categorisation and identification 
By consideration of the rôle of each human agent (individual or group) in the 
operation of dominant loops, establish what knowledge is deployed in that rôle.  
 
5. Loop Analysis and threat identification  
Each (dominant) loop is then examined, arrow-by-arrow to determine what would 
be the effect of disruption to the availability, timeliness or veracity of the 
knowledge identified so as to disrupt the operation of that component of each 
loop.  
This process can be time-consuming and should be carried out to a depth 
sufficient to ensure threat analysis of all significant dynamic loops is completed. 
As with any risk analysis, judgment must be applied as to the resource appropriate 
for the task. In general terms it is necessary to analyse fully all those loops which 
are judged by the informants to be significant to the system outputs. 
6. Further analysis 
There are a number of further analyses which can be done, the details of which we 
leave to later work. These are aimed at the mitigation and consequence/effect 
management parts of the process. As far as risk and threat identification are 
concerned, a useful further activity is to gather together the threat intervention 
mechanisms for each threat or factor. This then provides a convenient focus for 
the assessment and management of the threats and risk factors for the system. 
 
Building the model 
The Ebola outbreak has three main sub-models, consonant with the architecture of Fig 
3. These are: a local health care sub-model (See Figure 4), focusing on disease 
transmission mechanisms and the immediate realities of health care; a regional 
economy sub-model (Fig 5), containing many of the socially constructed variables 
expected in the situation; and a global issues sub-model (Fig 6) which illustrates some 
of the wider context of the outbreak into the immediate context of the developed 
world (DW). The entire model is shown for completeness as Figure 7. 
Certain variables in all the figures are truncated for space reasons. For example, in 
Figure 4 the variable ‘funding for drugs’ would more properly be expanded to 
‘funding for drugs , therapeutics and vaccines’ which covers non-drug treatments 
such as convalescent plasma. 
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Figure 4: Local health care sub-model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Regional economy sub-model 
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Figure 6: Global issues sub-model 
 
The sub-models are created by examining the issues described in the extensive 
literature on the outbreak. Table 1 shows an extract from this textual analysis, 
whereby variables in the ID emerge from examination of key descriptive passages in 
the papers, most of which were written by firsthand observers of the system in focus. 
Additionally, one of the authors of the paper, having firsthand experience of Ebola in-
country (Sierra Leone), has verified the structure of the model.  We are, therefore 
confident that, at least for the purposes of this risk identification example, the ID 
model of the outbreak is sufficiently robust.  
 
Table 1 near here 
 
It will be noted that the level of detail in the local health care system sub-model (Fig 
4) is substantially greater than that of the others. There are two (connected) reasons 
for this, neither of which is necessarily desirable; firstly the majority of the papers 
available, and therefore accessed, were written from the perspective of health care 
workers either on the ground and dealing with the brutal human effects of the 
outbreak or concerned with the direct support of these health workers; secondly, the 
management of such an outbreak inevitably is centred in the detailed management of 
the events and issues on the ground. To some extent the surrounding systems of 
regional economic management/influence and global effects can be aggregated, where 
the detailed management of the outbreak cannot. 
Inevitably, there is a degree of interpretation by the ID constructors as to the level of 
detail appropriate. An example of this is the interpretation within the model of ‘failure 
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to recognise the epidemic early’ (Table 1 column 2 first row) in terms of the 
diagnostic capacity of the staff in the ground (as ‘ability diagnose infected persons. 
While to the lay person these may seem separate, to the experts in the field the 
appearance of even one case of Ebola would trigger an immediate assumption of the 
risk of epidemic. 
The full model of the Ebola outbreak used to carry out the risk identification is 
shown, for completeness, in Annex A (full page Fig 10)).  
Local health care 
This sub-model, central to the representation of the EVD outbreak, is generic in the 
sense that it can be applied to any of the subject societies. It is an amalgam of 
observations deriving from the outbreaks in Zaire (Anon, 1978b; Breman et al, 1978; 
Team RoaWIS, 1978) , Northern Uganda (Anon, 2001; Borchert et al, 2011; CDC, 
2001, 2014; Francesconi et al, 2003; Hewlett and Amola, 2003; Raabe et al, 2010) 
and the DRC (Anon, 2003; Chowell et al, 2004; Dowell et al, 1999; Kersteins and 
Matthys, 1999; Khan et al, 1999; Muyembe-Tamfumm et al, 1999) as well as the 
West African outbreak itself (Dixon and Schafer, 2014; Merler et al, 2015; Nishiura 
and Chowell, 2014; WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014; Yamin et al, 2015). 
In spite of its apparent convoluted nature the sub-model is not difficult to interpret. 
On the left-hand side, centred on the variable funding available, a set of connections 
in solid line lead to a number of applications of that funding, viz. funding for drug, 
therapeutics and vaccine delivery, funding for drugs, therapeutics and vaccines, 
funding for facilities, funding for clinical staff and funding for support staff. Such 
solid arrows indicate positive correlation between the variables at each end of the 
arrow, so that it is understood to mean that an increase in funding available will 
provoke an increase in the other variables above. There is no assumption of degree 
strength or speed of connection in this qualitative modelling method (Powell, and 
Swart, 2005; Howard et al, 2007). 
Costs such as cost of staffing (top left hand side of Fig 4) connect in to funding 
available with a dotted arrow, indicating a negative correlation, so that as costs rise, 
they diminish the funds available. 
Even in this localized area of Fig 4 we can see some simple examples of the structures 
on which qualitative system dynamics analysis rests, namely the resonant dynamic 
structures known as loops. Figure 7 shows a small extract from Figure 4.  
 
Figure 7: Loop extracted from local health care sub-model - Loop 01 
Here we see a typical closed structure called a loop in which, as costs are incurred, the 
available (remaining) funding for facilities is reduced. We will see other more 
complex and significant ones later in the analysis. This loop of figure 7 is a goal 
funding available
cost of facilities
funding for
facilities
-
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seeking or compensating loop, since its operation is such that a small increase in one 
variable will tend to a decay in its effect as time progresses. Other, very significant 
loops exhibit runaway characteristics, where a small change in one variable, rather 
than dying out, propagates in a resonant fashion.  
Two of these, loops 02 and 03 can be seen in Figure 7 towards the centre of the 
diagram. 
 
Figure 8: Two runaway loops from the local health care sub-model 
The action of Loop 02 is straightforward: as the no of infected persons increases, the 
number of infective persons in the population concomitantly increases (no of infected 
persons ‘at large’), raising the number of people in contact with the virus and hence 
the no of infected persons is further raised.  This is in a sense the central aetiological 
mechanism of epidemic dynamics, as illustrated in Figure 2. Without intervention, the 
number of infected persons will rise without limit until the at-risk population is 
expended. 
Loop 03 requires a little more explanation: as the no of infected persons rises the 
number identified rises, leading to an increase in the no of patients quarantined. This 
leads to an increase in the no of beds occupied which places a demand on the number 
of medical staff required for patients, thus reducing the spare capacity (over-capacity 
(headroom) of medical services). Additionally, as the number of beds available 
decreases, the ability to isolate infected community members also decreases, putting 
hospitals and uninfected community groups at greater risk. As a result, the 
effectiveness of patient care reduces which reduces the survival rate, meaning that the 
no of infected persons at large increases. 
Both Loop 02 and 03, then, represent run-away processes, which, if unchecked, 
would, in the first case lead to massive untreated infection in the community and in 
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the second, to an overload of the medical system with similar infective consequences. 
Of course, mechanisms in the rest of the system will have an effect on these isolated 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, the identification of these important mechanisms provides 
both a basis for managerial action and, in the case of the focus of the present paper, 
the focus for the identification of risks, since, if we can assess the likelihood and 
mechanisms of disruption of the key dynamics as represented by these loops, we have 
a sound basis for risk identification and effects analysis. 
Regional economy 
Figure 5 shows the sub-model dealing with the local regional issues. It contains 
variables dealing with both the local economic effects (such as disposable income per 
capita and volume of local trade) and with some of the interaction between the region 
and the local economy. In particular, the degree of control by the governments of the 
affected region on population movement both within the local economies (mobility of 
populace) and within each country (degree of border control) are represented. The 
effect of stability of the relational governments can be explored through loops passing 
through the variable stability of governments in region (right hand side of Fig 5). 
 
 
Figure 9: Loop 04, showing an effect of the political stability in the region 
Loop 04 extracted from the right-hand side of Figure 9 shows that if the incidence of 
Ebola in the region rises political stability will fall, reducing the extent of 
administrative control and hence public compliance. Governments will then react by 
increasing their imposed constraints on public mobility including border control, 
which, in time, will reduce the rate of arrival of infected persons and reduce the 
incidence of Ebola. This loop, 04, is a compensating loop, which, while not as 
powerful a source of a managerial intervention agenda as is a run-away loop, 
nevertheless provides a source of analysis for risks. Loop 04 is counterintuitive in 
that, viewed from the perspective of a situation manager, it is desirable for there to be 
a degree of political instability, since this will induce more effective border controls 
There are, of course, both desirable and undesirable effects of such instability, which 
can be deduced from examination of Figure 5.  
Global issues 
Figure 6 shows the effects of the global economic issues, important here because of 
the inevitable connection between the outbreak in the region and the economy of the 
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developed world (DW). The connection with local issues is clearly seen; for example 
in the presence of variables such as effectiveness of local health measures and 
stability of regional governments. Examination of Figure 6 how the likely effect on 
the DW (perceived threat to DW economies) determines the willingness of the DW to 
intervene, an obvious but often unexplored connection.  
This last variable, stability of regional government, also appears in Figure 5, allowing 
a bridge between the two sub-models, and is an example of how the three sub-models 
are concatenated, by combining common variables, to form the somewhat dense full 
model of Figure 10, to be found in Annex A. 
There are several examples of action dilemmas at all levels of governance. At any 
point in the accelerating outbreak there are both ‘known knowns’, such as current 
number of daily new cases.; There are the possibly predictable ‘known unknowns’, 
such as what is the number of new cases to be seen in a month if safe isolation and 
treatment capacity is not increased and community transmission continues unabated. 
And there are the near ‘unknowable unknowns’, such as what will happen if a crisis is 
declared, borders are closed and transport limited which may possibly limit spread but 
will undoubtedly have detrimental political and economic ramifications. The same is 
true at on-the-ground control measures – without ability to discern whether an 
increase in isolation and treatment facility bed spaces, investment in diagnostic 
centres, community engagement and messaging, safe burial facilities, or some 
combination of the above will best impact on outbreak control, either poorly timed or 
misjudged investments may be made. Such complex decision-making occurs in fast-
paced, stressed environments, often without clear comparators or models of 
effectiveness, and with competing interests – rapid disease containment versus overall 
country functioning.  Decision paralysis is therefore prone to occur, and often only by 
playing out various loops and analyzing strategic vulnerabilities in advance will help 
mitigate this system’s functioning. The answers may clearly be very different at each 
stage of outbreak response and must be re-assessed constantly throughout. There is 
also the very real problem of the ‘Black Swan’ phenomena of the complete ‘unknown 
unknowns’, (Osterholm et al, 2015) such as what would happen if a simultaneous, 
similar-size EVD outbreak was introduced into the Indian or Chinese subcontinent, or 
a global influenza pandemic coincided with peak EVD transmission. We must at least 
think of the possibility of these scenarios to determine how they may curtail 
individual control efforts. 
Identification of key dynamics 
The identification of the key dynamic mechanisms of a system dynamics ID is a well-
known problem, which is approached by a combination of automatic methods and 
visual inspection. In general, the analyst seeks to identify sufficient loops as to cover 
the diagram, but there is an element of judgment applied in selecting an ensemble of 
loops such that the key dominant mechanisms are captured. In the EVD example, 
some 25 loops of varying significance were identified. In order to illustrate of the risk 
identification process, from here on, we select two loops for detailed analysis, one 
being centered on the local health issues (Loop 03 of Fig 8, extracted from the sub-
model of Fig. 4) and one on the regional scene of Figure 5 (loop 04, extracted from 
the sub-model of Figure 6) but the process is identical for however many loops are 
deemed to be significant by the analyst.  
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Risk identification 
Tables 2 and 3 (full page) show the risk identification process followed.  
Tables 2 and 3 near here 
In its simplest form, for each loop, the tables identify (column 2) the agents who have 
influence over the strength of activity in the loop. There are more sophisticated 
analysis steps which can be include which take into account the strength and speed of 
each loop’s operation (Powell et. al., 2016). While this improves the analyst’s ability 
to weigh risks one against the other and is particularly recommended at the stage of 
loop selection, it does not affect the risk identification stage of the analysis presented 
here. 
Column 3 shows both the tacit and explicit knowledge deployed by those agents in 
the particular loop. One of the strengths of the method presented here is the specific 
consideration of tacit knowledge. It is relatively easy to appreciate how explicit, 
codified, overtly communicated knowledge is used in a crisis (for example, here, the 
scientifically-derived symptomatology of EHF needed by a number of parties not all 
of whom are medically trained (Police (P), family members (F) and local leaders 
(LL), for example). It is less obvious without the level of analysis proposed here what 
the rôle is of the tacit knowledge, such as the need for the police to balance their 
commitment to ‘business as usual’ crime prevention vis-à-vis the detection of infected 
persons, or at a more subtle level, the detection of suspicious behaviour in the 
immediate relatives of infected persons and the inference of the presence of a possible 
EHF victim. 
Some of these knowledge requirements are obvious to holders of the function but not 
necessarily to risk analysts. For example, the varieties of diplomatic knowledge 
required on the part of agent IN in table 3 (the international diplomatic effort) is a 
mixture of obvious legal and procedural knowledge of the accepted diplomatic 
channels and protocols, with a component of tacit knowledge to do with the way in 
which West African diplomats will react in the particular circumstances of the Ebola 
outbreak. None of this will be foreign to skilled diplomats, but may well not be 
expressed in a full risk analysis by a non-diplomat. 
Column 4 of the table is an extraction of the key risks emerging specifically from the 
knowledge analysis. Inevitably the risks explicated in Column 4 have a value 
judgment associated with them deriving from both an inherent understanding of the 
importance of the mechanisms implied by the loop selection and the effects of the 
absence of the knowledge identified in Column 3 on the loop behaviour. 
As is the case with much risk identification work, only a small fraction of the risks 
identified in column 4 will be enacted in any particular situation. In the outbreak 
under discussion here there are many examples of knowledge failure of a predictable 
nature, such as the effect of press coverage on public opinion in an unexpected way 
(Table 3, agent P) or the early failure of medical staff to deploy some of their number 
on case detection in the community rather than the treatment of identified patients 
(Table 2, agents M and P). Other events in the Ebola outbreak were less predictable. 
For example, the riots of 20 August 2104 in Liberia (New York Times, 2014), 
resulting (on this analysis) from a knowledge failure of the effects of the true state of 
morale in the population (Table 3, agent EX) and of the appropriate use of Aid to the 
Civil Power, or ACP (Table 3, agent, EX) were demonstrably not predicted by the 
administration of Liberia. 
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Utility and role of approach – Discussion and Future Development 
The management of knowledge in an organisation, while essential to its success, is 
not the only focus for strategic management. Similarly, the identification of risks 
emerging from knowledge failure forms only part of the overall risk identification 
processes emerging from a wider consideration (Powell et al, 2016). Nevertheless, the 
risks deriving from failure to provide knowledge at the time and point of use is, we 
submit, as important as information failures and other mechanisms. In the Ebola case 
here, for example, the failure of the medical workers to understand the importance of 
detecting the presence of, identifying and extracting for quarantine, unreported cases 
in the population proved almost catastrophic in some of the West African countries. 
In Nigeria, however, where that knowledge was both available and acted upon, the 
effect on infectivity of undetected infected patients was significantly less and 
contributed to the substantially more effective epidemic control performance in that 
country. 
The purpose of this paper has not been to show a better model of the Ebola outbreak, 
although the system model of Figures 2,3, 4 and 9 has been verified against the 
multitude of reports available (Fisman et al, 2014; Legrand et al, 2007; Lewnard et al, 
2014). Neither has it been to advocate the sole use of a knowledge-based risk 
identification procedure. Rather, we present a response to the relative paucity of 
knowledge based risk identification in a complementary manner to more general 
approaches, such as that of Cook and Rasmussen (2015). The analysis of the 
relatively complex crisis of Ebola in West Africa illustrates the usefulness of this 
knowledge-based approach. Work continues both to establish the transferability of 
this approach to other epidemics and related crises, with an emphasis on the pre-crisis 
appreciation of risk (ECDPC, 2015) and on a generalised crisis model, probably 
restricted to medical crises, which can be compared with existing practice in risk 
containment. The extension of the technique towards specific response identification 
would seem worthwhile. 
It can be argued that the qualitative approach described here is limited in the precision 
of its representation when compared with a qualitative approach. This debate has been 
active in the system dynamics community for a considerable time (Coyle 1996; 
Ackermann et al, 2014). Both approaches co-exist within that community for good 
reasons; while the quantitative form of system representation does indeed produce 
precision when and where the variables can be made numerical, but, in many cases, 
such numerical representation is not available to the modeller. We assert that such is 
the case of risk identification and assessment specifically, because of the nature of the 
three intersecting subsystems identified in Figure 3. It will be possible to represent 
sub-dynamics of the risk system, particularly within the physical subsystem of Fig 3, 
but if risk identification were to be limited to those aspects which are quantifiable, 
large areas of identifiable risk will fail to be identified. It is our contention that the 
approach described here provides a useful scoping technique within which specific 
numerical approaches can subsequently operate.  
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Sources of model variables 
Variable in models Citation Reference 
degree of 
concentration of 
infected patients 
mobility of general 
public 
infectivity 
ability to diagnose 
infected persons 
The reasons for the magnitude of the West African 
epidemic are therefore likely to lie with non-
virological factors such as population density, 
poverty, lack of access to medical care, funerary 
practices, and failure to recognise the outbreak early 
Gatherer, D 
(2015) 
local investment in 
health services 
quality of medical 
systems 
amount of direct 
foreign aid 
Limitation of future outbreaks depends on rapid 
response, development of health infrastructure, and 
infusion of human and material resources. 
Physicians in endemic areas need to be aware of the 
diffuse presentation of EVD in its early stages. 
mobility of general 
public 
gov’t constraints on 
mobility 
The populations of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone are highly interconnected, with much cross-
border traffic at the epicenter and relatively easy 
connections by road between rural towns and 
villages and between densely populated national 
capitals. 
WHO Ebola 
Response Team 
(2014) 
no of identified 
infected patients 
There are numerous reports of symptomatic persons 
evading diagnosis and treatment, of laboratory 
diagnoses that have not been included in national 
databases, and of persons with suspected EVD who 
were buried without a diagnosis having been made 
no of identified 
infected patients 
no of patients 
quarantined 
infectivity 
mobility of infected 
persons 
transmission can be stopped by a combination of 
early diagnosis, contact tracing, patient isolation and 
care, infection control, and safe burial 
extent of gov’t 
mobility control 
The critical determinant of epidemic size appears to 
be the speed of implementation of rigorous control 
measures. 
no of identified 
infected patients 
no of patients 
quarantined 
To curtail transmission in the community, the period 
from symptom onset to hospitalization (a mean of 5 
days but a maximum of >40 days) clearly needs to 
be reduced 
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degree of 
concentration of 
infected patients 
mobility of general 
public 
infectivity 
ability to diagnose 
infected persons 
Forward projections suggest that unless control 
measures — including improvements in contact 
tracing, adequate case isolation, increased capacity 
for clinical management, safe burials, greater 
community engagement, and support from 
international partners — improve quickly, these 
three countries will soon be reporting thousands of 
cases and deaths each week 
effectiveness of 
curative treatments 
Experimental therapeutics and vaccines offer 
promise for the future but are unlikely to be 
available 
quality of facilities The disintegration of the health care systems in the 
affected countries is already having a profound 
impact 
Farrar and Piot 
(2014) 
degree of border 
control 
degree of 
concentration of 
infected patients 
mobility of general 
public 
infectivity 
ability to diagnose 
infected persons 
funding for support 
staff 
funding for medical 
staff 
funding for drug 
delivery 
local investment in 
health services 
quality of medical 
systems 
[T]here is now increased travel from previously 
isolated areas, allowing for spread of the outbreak 
into densely populated urban areas. Increased access 
to medical care, with amplification of transmission 
in health care facilities, has also likely contributed to 
the larger outbreak. 
Cultural and societal practices have contributed to 
the extent of the outbreak in West Africa. Family 
[put]themselves at high risk for infection through 
contact with infectious materials: blood, feces, 
vomit, or other body fluids. Family members are 
fearful that it is the hospitals themselves that are 
causing the infections; as a result, EVD cases and 
their contacts have been hidden from health 
authorities. … limited availability of sanitation and 
public health infrastructure. Burial practices 
…include preparation of the body for burial and 
close contact of family members with the 
deceased…. 
Tosh PK, 
Sampathkumar 
P. (2014) 
infectivity 
mobility of infected 
persons 
gov’t constraints on 
mobility 
On October 22, the CDC announced that public 
health authorities will begin active postarrival 
monitoring of travelers whose travel originates in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Guinea. 
infectivity 
mobility of infected 
Affected countries must also do a better job of 
dealing with patients and educating the public about 
Check Hayden 
E. (2014) 
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persons the disease, say doctors and scientists. 
infectivity 
mobility of infected 
persons 
Officials are likely to make more progress fighting 
Ebola’s spread if they explain their actions and show 
concern for those affected 
gov’t constraints on 
mobility 
Travel restrictions may hamper the deployment of 
personnel and support in the region, ultimately 
creating a counter productive effect i 
Gomes MFC, 
Rossi L, et al. 
(2014) 
gov’t constraints on 
mobility 
no of identified 
infected patients 
The probability of any country to experience EVD 
case importation depends on the passenger flow 
from the areas affected by the outbreak, the case 
numbers and the duration of the incubation time 
infectivity 
mobility of infected 
persons 
specific cultural elements and local beliefs must be 
taken into account to ensure proper messages, 
confidence, and close cooperation of the community 
Hewlett BS and 
Amola RP 
(2003) 
 
Table 1: Extract from text analysis of descriptive Ebola papers showing concordance 
with ID variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
